South Korea's National Assembly has adopted a non-binding resolution urging the operational recovery of Homeplus, the country's second-largest hypermarket operator, which entered court-supervised restructuring in March 2025. The move by the National Policy Committee — the parliamentary body that oversees the Financial Services Commission — marks an unusual instance of the legislature formally inserting itself into the rehabilitation of a single commercial enterprise. Behind it lies a combustible mix of mass job insecurity and an existential threat to thousands of small suppliers.
Five months under court protection: what has changed?
Homeplus filed for corporate rehabilitation with the Seoul Bankruptcy Court on 4th March 2025. For the country's second-ranked large-format retailer to seek court protection was, by any measure, an unprecedented shock to the domestic retail industry. The company disclosed debts of approximately 5 trillion won (roughly $3.7bn), with a short-term liquidity crisis serving as the immediate trigger.
The court has since initiated due diligence in preparation for a formal rehabilitation plan. Homeplus operates around 130 stores nationwide and employs approximately 25,000 people directly and indirectly. Industry estimates put the number of supplier firms at roughly 5,000, a significant proportion of them small and medium-sized businesses now facing their own financial crises as unpaid receivables mount.
What the resolution says — and what it cannot do
Parliamentary resolutions in South Korea carry no legal force, but their political weight can be considerable. The resolution, as reported, calls on MBK Partners — the private-equity firm that owns Homeplus — to make genuine and responsible efforts to contribute its own capital; for outstanding payments to suppliers to be settled promptly; for job security to be guaranteed; and for the rehabilitation plan to be drawn up transparently.
The pointed reference to MBK Partners has attracted the most attention. The firm acquired Homeplus from Britain's Tesco in 2015 for approximately 7.2 trillion won, and has sat at the apex of the company's ownership structure for a decade. Critics from both opposition and, notably, some ruling-party legislators argue that MBK extracted value through asset disposals and dividends after the acquisition, then transferred the resulting risks onto creditors, workers, and the broader public. MBK has responded by saying it is "doing its utmost to normalise Homeplus's operations," while declining to confirm the scale or timing of any fresh capital injection.
A double burden: suppliers and workers
Supplier associations, including the Korea Federation of SMEs and Self-Employed, have repeatedly sounded the alarm over unpaid bills since the restructuring filing. Industry sources estimate outstanding receivables owed to suppliers run into the hundreds of billions of won. Some small firms derive 30–50% of their revenues from Homeplus, raising the prospect of a cascade of secondary insolvencies.
Homeplus's trade unions are equally anxious about potential restructuring. Rehabilitation plans for court-managed companies typically include workforce reductions and store closures. Homeplus is reportedly already reviewing the viability of certain outlets, with partial cutbacks or outright closures under consideration.
Comparison with rivals — and an instructive foreign precedent
The contrast with Homeplus's domestic peers is stark. Emart, the market leader, restructured its underperforming stores from 2019 onwards under its own steam, without recourse to court protection. Lotte Mart took a similar path, quietly closing loss-making sites through internal processes. Both companies managed their difficulties without formal insolvency proceedings — the critical difference from the Homeplus situation.
A more apt international parallel is the collapse of BHS, the British retailer, in 2016. Sold to private-equity interests and subsequently hollowed out by a combination of pension deficits and management failures, BHS was liquidated, costing roughly 11,000 jobs. The episode prompted serious debate in Britain's parliament about strengthening accountability for private-equity firms following corporate acquisitions — a conversation that South Korea now appears to be beginning in earnest.
Doubts about the resolution's effectiveness
Legal and academic opinion is divided on what the parliamentary resolution can realistically achieve. One corporate law specialist cautioned that, lacking any binding force, the resolution cannot directly influence the Seoul Bankruptcy Court's proceedings. Others, particularly researchers focused on economic democracy, take a more optimistic view: an official statement of legislative intent can, they argue, exert indirect pressure on creditor negotiations and on the behaviour of the controlling shareholder.
Some analysts read the resolution as groundwork for regulatory legislation targeting private equity. The National Policy Committee's remit covers the Financial Services Commission, and its resolution could plausibly feed into discussions about amending the Capital Markets Act to impose stricter post-acquisition management obligations on private-equity funds.
Rehabilitation or liquidation?
The Seoul Bankruptcy Court is expected to convene creditor meetings to decide whether to approve a rehabilitation plan. Should creditors withhold their consent, the company could face a declaration of bankruptcy — which would constitute the largest corporate liquidation in South Korean retail history.
Retail industry specialists see Homeplus's best chance of survival in a significant reduction of its store footprint combined with a strategic pivot integrating its physical and digital operations. A slimmed-down network of its strongest stores, supported by an enhanced range of own-label products and competitive fresh-food offerings, is the restructuring scenario most commonly discussed. The overriding challenge, however, remains finding the working capital to execute any such plan.
The passage of the parliamentary resolution signals that the Homeplus affair has transcended an ordinary corporate failure. It has become a complex socioeconomic debate where private-equity regulation, the protection of domestic retail, and the survival of small supplier ecosystems all intersect. How South Korea's legislature, judiciary, and executive branch each respond — and what they collectively produce — could reshape both the country's corporate governance landscape and the regulatory framework governing private equity for years to come.